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Abstract. A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their
ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this
issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, where each agent plays with its local neighbors, collects an aggre-
gate payoff and imitates the strategy of its best neighbor. We allow the agents to
adapt their local neighborhood according to their satisfaction level and the strategy
played. We show that a steady state is reached, where the strategy and network
configurations remain stationary. While the fraction of cooperative agents is high
in these states, their average payoff is lower than the one attained by the defec-
tors. The system self-organizes in such a way that the structure of links in the
network is quite inhomogeneous, revealing the occurrence of cooperator “leaders”
with a very high connectivity, which guarantee that global cooperation can be sus-
tained in the whole network. Perturbing the leaders produces drastic changes of the
network, leading to global dynamical cascades. These cascades induce a transient
oscillation in the population of agents between the nearly all-defectors state and the
all-cooperators outcome, before setting again in a state of high global cooperation.
1 Introduction
In the agent-based models used in Social Sciences, Economy and Political Econ-
omy, agents interact directly with one another, and a social macrostructure emerges
from these interactions. The implications of these models are easily studied with
computer simulations. In this computational approach it is very natural to imple-
ment a network of interactions among the agents [9]. In addition, such computer
simulations permit to study the dynamical evolution of the social structures.
In this context, an important question that is being addressed in a number of
ways is how the aggregate or global behavior emerges from the individual char-
acteristics of the agents. A particular aspect of this question is to understand if
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the global behavior is determined by average commonly found agents or if a few
individual distinct agents can have a strong influence in the emerging macrostruc-
ture. In the latter case such special agents play the role of social leaders. Generally
speaking, the influence of each agent depends on the network of interactions with
other agents, an interaction being represented by a link between two agents. These
interactions can be restricted to a set of agents placed in neighboring sites of a reg-
ular spatial lattice, can reach arbitrary agents as in a random network or can occur
through intermediate “small-world” networks [17]. In most cases, this network of
interactions is fixed and given from the outset. However, it is natural to consider
situations in which the network of interactions evolves dynamically adapting itself
to the emerging global structure.
In this paper we tackle the problem of how cooperation arises in a dynamically
evolving network of agents. The network adaptation allows the emergence of an
asymptotic state dominated by those special agents which in the course of the
dynamical evolution are able to establish a much larger number of links than the
average agent.
The paradigm to study the emergence of cooperation has been the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game. Using evolutionary game theory [18], it was shown [3,2] that
cooperation may be sustained by a population of agents meeting repeatedly through
global random interactions. Two agents interact playing the game and, according to
their outcome, their strategies are allowed to evolve. A second route to cooperative
behavior, pioneered by Nowak and May 1, comes from the consideration of “spatial
games”. In these games every individual interacts only with a given subset from the
whole population (e.g. the neighbors). The neighbors are defined by a fixed network
of interactions. The spatial network can promote the emergence of cooperation in
situations in which global non-cooperative behavior results if the interactions were
random and homogeneous. Here we also consider a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. The novelty is that the group of agents with which a given one interacts
adapts endogenously during the dynamical evolution. The adaptation of the network
builds up cooperation.
In our computer simulation of the game we implement two dynamical rules.
The first one is an action update: At each time step, each agent plays the same
strategy cooperate (C) or defect (D) with all its local neighbors. Then the agents
revise their individual strategies and imitate the neighbors strategy with highest
aggregate payoff. Only a few agents will be found to be satisfied and will keep their
strategy. The second rule is the network update: Unsatisfied agents are allowed to
change their local neighborhood. Specifically, we let defectors break with a certain
probability any link with other defectors, and replace them with new neighbors
selected randomly from the whole network. The motivation behind this rule is that
two defectors playing a PD game would certainly prefer to change its neighbor in
order to find a cooperator from whom to ‘exploit’ a better payoff.
The results of our simulations show that the network of agents reaches a steady
state with a high degree of cooperative behavior. The fraction of agents that coop-
erate depends only slightly on the incentive to defect in the individual game. This
1 See for e.g. [14,11,10,6,15]. A cellular automata representation with several learn-
ing rules is presented in Ref. [8]. For an extensive study of the dynamics of a PD
game with different strategies, evolution of the strategies and different networks
see Ref. [4].
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behavior contrasts with previous studies on “spatial” PD games where partial coop-
eration was reached, but it was observed that the fraction of agents which are coop-
erators strongly decreases as the incentive to defect is increased. This feature results
from the adaptation of the network and it is reflected in the non-homogeneous struc-
ture that it reaches during the dynamical evolution. We will show that the process
of “searching” cooperative neighbors performed by defectors, results in the emer-
gence of a leader agent, defined as the cooperator with the largest number of links
with other agents in the network. When the leader is not the wealthiest (i.e., the
one with largest payoff), the network is in an unstable situation and, depending on
the parameter p measuring network adaptation, recurrent global cascades may be
observed. These cascades induce large oscillations in the fraction of agents which
are cooperators, together with a large reorganization of the network. In most cases,
a final state with a high degree of cooperation is reached. We have also tested the
robustness of such cooperative state. We find that a perturbation (spontaneous
change of strategy) on a non-leader usually results in a short transient dynamics
returning to the steady state. However, when a leader is perturbed, global cascades
may be observed in the system before a state with a high degree of cooperation is
recovered. This identifies the importance of the highly-connected agents which play
the role of social leaders in the collective dynamics of the system.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section defines the spatial version of
the PD game in an adaptive network. Section 3 describes our numerical results on
the emergence of cooperation. In Section 4 we discuss the evolution of the network
and the emergence of the ”leader” agents. Finally in Section 5, we summarize our
results.
2 Spatial Prisoners Dilemma in an adaptive network
We consider the following framework: N agents sit in the nodes of an adaptive
network Γ where the links define their neighborhoods. Each agent plays a PD game
only with those other agents directly connected by one link. In this paper, we will
restrict ourselves to the case of bidirectional or undirected links, and interactions to
first neighbors. Indirect interactions with neighbors’ neighbors have been studied
for example in [5,16,7]. Thus, two agents are neighbors if they are directly connected
by one link. We define the neighborhood of agent i as the subset of Γ which are
neighbors of i, and we represent it as neigh(i); its cardinal is Ki. The coordination
number, K, is defined as the average number of links per node
K =
∑N
i=1
Ki
N
. (1)
In this paper we consider random networks Γ with coordination number K formed
by distributing KN/2 links between pairs of nodes (i, j), with the constraint that
(i, j) = (j, i) (bidirectional links). The resulting distribution of the number of links
in the network is Poissonian with the maximum located at the coordination number
K.
We denote by si(t) = {0, 1} the strategy of agent i at time step t, where si = 1
corresponds to play cooperation (C), and si = 0 corresponds to defection (D), and
will be referred to as C-agents or D-agents, respectively. The payoff matrix for a
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2-agent PD game is shown in Table 1, where it is standard to take b > σ > δ > 0
and b/2 < σ.
Table 1. Prisoners Dilemma payoff matrix
C D
C σ, σ 0, b
D b, 0 δ, δ
We consider the situation in which agents seek the largest possible benefit from
their local interactions in the network Γ . We assume each agent plays the same
strategy with all its neighbors neigh(i), and the strategy is updated by all the
agents at the same time; synchronous update. The time evolution is as follows:
1. Each agent i plays the PD game with each neighbor using the same strategy
si and collecting a total individual payoff Πi,
Πi = siµiσ + (1− si) (µib+ (Ki − µi)δ) , (2)
where Ki is the number of links of agent i and µi is the number of neighbors
of agent i that are C-agents.
2. Agent i revises its current strategy at each iteration of the game (i.e. at every
time step), and updates it by imitating the strategy of its neighbor with a
highest pay-off. Agent i is said to be satisfied if it has the largest pay-off in his
neighborhood. Otherwise it will be unsatisfied and it will revise its strategy.
3. Network Rule: each agent may adapt its local neighborhood:
if agent i is an unsatisfied D-agent then with probability p breaks a link with a
D-neighbor α ∈neigh(i), and replace it with a new agent β uniformly from Γ .
This scheme leads to a time evolution of the structure of the whole network, but
the coordination number K remains constant: for each unsatisfied D-agent i, it will
replace (on average) (Ki−µi)p D-neighbors by new neighbors randomly chosen for
the whole set, and thus its local coordination number, Ki, will not change; however,
the replaced D-agents will lose one link and the new selected ones will gain one link.
The network rule justification is based on the assumption that given two D-
agents playing a PD game, if they are unsatisfied, then they would prefer to ex-
change D-neighbors with the hope of finding a new C-neighbor from whom to exploit
a much better individual payoff. This effectively amounts to ascribe a “searching”
capability to D-agents. In our proposed setting the searching is not optimized, in
the sense that the searching is random, so D-agents taking its chance to improve its
payoff may end up with a new C-neighbor with a larger payoff, forcing it to replicate
this new strategy in the next time step. In the same spirit, one could think that
cooperators would also have a preference to break links with other D-agents. We
prefer to keep this asymmetry in roles so that D-agents may be described as being
competitive in nature, while C-agents remain conservative2.
2 In [1] agents may refuse to play with other agents irrespective of the strategy
played.
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The probability p is a measure of the adaptability of the network. Dynamically,
this parameter acts effectively as a time scale for the evolution of the network. For
p = 0 the network does not evolve and remains fixed, while for 0 6= p ≪ 1 the
evolution is very slow as the adaptation takes over only after several trials. For
p ∼ 1 the adaptation is done at the same speed as the game is being played. In
other terms, p represents a transaction cost composed of two parts: first, the cost of
breaking an agreement and second, the cost of finding a new partner and that this
new partner accepts the agreement. One could separate these two costs, and would
have a process of breaking links (with a given probability q) and another process
of generation of links (with a probability r). However for the sake of simplicity we
consider these two processes as a single one.
We have also investigated other variations of the network adaptation rule. For
example, instead of breaking links with any of the unsatisfied D-neighbors, we also
tested a rule which allows an unsatisfied D-agent break with probability p solely
the link with its D-neighbor with largest pay-off. The qualitative results obtained
with this adaptation rule are rather similar [19].
It is worth making the following remarks:
• Links between satisfied agents do not change, which it seems to be a reasonable
assumption.
• It is clear from the network adaptation rule, that not only D-agents may actively
change their neighborhood, but also C-agents will passively evolve their own
set of players by receiving new links from “searching” D-agents.
• In the present model, we do not take into account spontaneous creation or
destruction of links, therefore the total number of links in the network Γ is
conserved.
• In a standard 2-agent Prisoner’s Dilemma game there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium (D,D). In a previous work [19], we considered a variation of the
PD payoff matrix with δ = 0, for comparison with [14,11]. In this situation the
2-agent PD game has as pure Nash equilibria either (C,D), (D,C) or (D,D).
However the results in [14,11] indicate that, at least for fixed regular network,
no qualitatively difference is found in the spatial games when using 1≫ δ > 0.
In the next sections we present the results of computer simulations of the model
described above. We take as a free parameter the incentive to defect b. We consider
random initial networks with coordination number K = 4 and K = 8 and several
values of the adaptability parameter p. We investigate, among others, the following
statistical measures: (i) the fraction of cooperators, that it, the fraction of agents
which are C-agents, denoted by fC = (
∑N
i=1
si)/N , (ii) the average payoff per agent
Π = (
∑N
i=1
Πi)/N of the whole network and the distribution of payoff, (iii) the
probability of having a link between two C-agents, pCC , between a C-agent and a
D-agent, pCD, and between two D-agents, pDD. These probabilities satisfy:
1 = pCC + 2pCD + pDD . (3)
Throughout this work, the parameter b which controls the incentive to defect
was varied in the range 1 < b < 2, while the other PD payoff matrix elements
were fixed to δ = 0.1 and σ = 1. Finally, if not otherwise stated, the network Γ
consists of N = 10000 agents, with an initial fraction of 0.6N C-agents randomly
distributed in the network.
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Table 2. Average fraction of C-agents, fC , for different initial random networks,
with and without network adaptation. The results are averaged over 10 different
initial conditions after T = 300 time steps of evolution.
K = 4 K = 4 K = 8 K = 8
b p = 0 p = 1 p = 0 p = 1
1.05 0.89 0.942 0.95 0.994
1.15 0.87 0.947 0.90 0.989
1.35 0.59 0.920 0.58 0.988
1.55 0.31 0.900 0.38 0.988
1.75 0.09 0.885 0.03 0.983
1.95 0.04 0.889 0.01 0.962
3 Cooperation enhancement in an adaptive network
The PD game with local interactions in non-adaptive (p = 0) regular lattices,
has been previously studied in Refs. [14,15,13]. These studies showed how partial
cooperation can be sustained due to the local interactions, in spite of memory-
less strategies. Several extensions to this spatial model have been studied in the
literature. For example, introducing asynchronous updates [6] or introducing errors
in the imitation process [12], the basic results persist [13].
For comparison with the adaptive network considered below, we give in Table 2
some numerical results for a fixed (p = 0) random network. Such network is our
initial condition for the adaptive network. We see that the average fraction of C-
agents decreases with an increasing value of the incentive to defect b. Notice that
depending on the characteristic coordination number K, there is a critical b = b∗
such that for larger values of b the system reaches a state of all D-agents. That is,
for b < b∗ partial cooperation is supported in these networks. We obtain for K = 8 a
critical b∗ ≈ 1.75. The numerical results also show that increasing the average size
of the neighborhood (average number of links per agent, K) the average number of
C-agents fC decreases faster with b.
When the network is able to adapt with the outcome of the individual games,
either the dynamics settles onto a steady state after some transient time, or the
system reaches a full defect state where all the agents are playing D and the net-
work is continuously evolving. To compare the asymptotic dynamics of the fraction
of cooperators between the adaptive and non-adaptive case, we illustrate in Fig. 1
a time series of fC evolving for 0 < t < 150 in a fixed network (p = 0), and then
for 150 < t < 300 with a fully adaptive network (p = 1). We observe that the
fraction of cooperators increases as the adaptation is turned on. Table 2 illustrates
this behavior for other values of b. We conclude that the network adaptation en-
hances a highly cooperative network. Also notice that in the non-adaptive case, the
fraction of cooperators fluctuates slightly, while in the adaptive case a steady state
is reached.
It is important to notice that in order to obtain the above results, the initial
fraction of cooperators in the network has to be sufficiently large. In all our numeric
computations we took an initial fraction of 0.6N of C-agents, which proved to be a
good number for the coordination numbers studied. This was also noticed in previ-
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Fig. 1. (a) Time series of the fraction of cooperative agents fC and average payoff
Π of the whole network. For 0 < t < 150 the network is fixed p = 0, while for
150 < t < 300 the network is fully adapting p = 1. (b) Corresponding time series
of the different links probabilities: two C-agents (pCC), a C and a D-agent (pCD),
and two D-agents (pDD) having a link. (c) Distribution of D-D-links, C-C-links,
D-C-links and C-D-links for the steady state. (b = 1.35, K = 8).
ous spatial games and reflects the fact that the cooperative strategy will replicate
throughout the network, only if (the approximate) average payoff of C-agents is
larger than the one of D-agents. We will show below that in some circumstances,
perturbations of the network may destroy the cooperative outcome and lead to a
full defective network. Such asymptotic state is a dynamical state, since the network
is continuously adapting but never finding a C-agent to exploit.
The steady state found in the adaptive network corresponds to a stationary
network structure and to a stationary configuration of strategies. When the sys-
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tem reaches a steady state, there are necessarily no links between D-agents, thus
pDD = 0 (see Fig. 1(b)), except in the unlikely case of having exactly the same
aggregate payoff. Also, in general we have that pCD 6= 0. Therefore, the steady
state is composed by a collection of cooperators exploited by D-agents.
We define a chain of cooperators, as a connected component in N of sites oc-
cupied by cooperators in which each cooperator except the last one is linked to
a neighboring cooperator with larger pay-off. All cooperators in the chain except
the last one are actually unsatisfied, but as they imitate the same strategy they
were playing on the previous step, they never change their relative payoff. When
the system reaches a steady state (pDD = 0), the only possibility for D-agents is
to exploit the agents of a given chain and must necessarily be satisfied. In terms of
payoff we say that D-agents are “passive” local maxima, in the sense that they have
the maximum payoff in their neighborhood but nobody is imitating their strategy.
In summary, every cooperator chain should satisfy the following ordering in terms
of payoff:
Πl(i) > Πr ≥ Πi, r ∈ neigh(i) (4)
where i is a C-agent imitating from C-agent l(i), and r is an exploiting D-agent
of i. It is clear that the number of different steady states which one can construct
satisfying eq. (4) is huge for a fair number of agents N .
Finally, another salient feature of our cooperative network model is the inho-
mogeneous distribution of payoff for each subpopulation, which differs substantially
from the non-adaptive network case. Figure 2 displays such distributions (normal-
ized to the number of individuals in each subpopulation), and reveals that although
defectors are outnumbered by cooperators, on average they are wealthier. This is
an interesting result, which indicates that, in the long run, the searching capabil-
ity of the D-agents rewards them. This behavior is observed systematically in the
parameter regime 1 < b < 2 for K = 8.
The above result seems surprising from the point of view of the traditional repli-
cation dynamics [18] used in evolutionary game theory, because one could conclude
from Fig. 2 that D-agents should dominate the whole population. But our results
indicate that the final highly cooperative state is not determined by average agents
in the system, but rather by a small subset of those maximally connected C-agents.
In the next section we discuss the important role played by these cooperative leaders,
defined as those C-agents with the largest number of links.
4 Dynamics of network evolution and emergence of
leaders
The network rule allows for the evolution of the connectivity of every agent and
permits that the network reaches a steady state. The distribution of links in this
steady state displays the heterogeneous structure of the network. Figure 1(c) shows
the distribution of links between two C-, D-, and between D-C and C-D agents.
Notice the broad band distribution of links between two C-agents, which may reach
as 5 times the average connectivity of the network. Defectors, on the other hand, are
shown to be connected only to C-agents, and have a narrow distribution centered
at K.
The tail of the distributions of links identifies a very small number of C-agents
with a large number of links to other C-agents We define the C-agent with the
Cooperation, adaptation and leadership 9
0 10 20 30
Π
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
pr
ob
(Π
)
D
C
0 10 20 30
Π
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
pr
ob
(Π
)
D
C
Fig. 2. Distribution of individual payoff for each subpopulation (C and D-agents)
in a final equilibrium state (normalized to each subpopulation). (a) b = 1.25, (b)
b = 1.75. (p = 1.0, K = 8).
maximum number of links as the leader. In a steady state this agent should be
satisfied and leading a chain of cooperators. The number of C-agents which can fit
on a given chain connected to the leader may be huge.
Table 3. Maximum number of links of the leader agent (Kα), the D-agent with
a largest number of links (Kβ), and corresponding payoffs (Πα, Πβ) for different
values of b in a steady state. The results are averaged over 30 different initial
conditions, K = 8 and p = 1.
b Kα Kβ Πα Πβ
1.15 25.8 11.2 25.8 12.9
1.35 40.5 11.7 40.5 15.8
1.55 54.1 11.8 54.1 18.3
1.75 56.9 13.0 56.9 22.8
1.95 72.1 14.0 72.1 27.4
We have calculated the number of links of the leader agent for different values of
the incentive to defect b in a steady state. Table 3 gives a measure of the connectivity
of the leader, labeled α, compared with the number of links of the most connected
D-agent labeled β (recall that all connections are exploiting other C-agents), with
their corresponding payoffs. Notice that for increasing b the number of links of the
leader increases while it remains essentially constant for the defector with largest
number of links.
The leader agent leads the cooperative collective state of the system in several
ways. On one hand, the leader favors the creation of chains of cooperators. On the
other hand, and provided there are links between D-agents, leaders are selected
through the dynamics of the adapting network, and are a direct consequence of the
“searching” done by D-agents. Consider for example a D-agent j which exchanges
one of its D-neighbors with the leader α. Assume that Πα > Πj . In the next time
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step the D-agent will become a cooperator by imitation and
Kα(t+ 1) = Kα(t) + 1 (5)
Whenever the payoff of the leader is the largest payoff in the whole network its
connectivity increases as described by (5).
However, an unstable situation occurs whenever the leader does not have the
largest payoff in the whole network. If the leader α receives a D-neighbor with a
larger payoff, in the subsequent time steps a drastic event happens, for alpha and
its associated chain will imitate the D-strategy. If after this cascading imitation
there are C-agents left in the network, a new leader with a fewer number of links
will be selected; otherwise a full defective network may be reached. This indicates
the sensibility of the network structure to small perturbations on individual spe-
cially well-connected agents: A local event associated with a particular individual
propagates in macrodynamical avalanches into the full network.
The phenomenon described above does not exclude the possibility that a D-
agent j selects a C-agent which would satisfy (4), allowing agent j to become a
passive local maximum and exploit the C-agent. In fact, it is by this mechanism
that D-agents also increase their payoff.
We have performed several computer simulations to visualize the dynamic evo-
lution of the network which we have just discussed. Each panel of Fig. 3 shows a
comparison of the payoff of the leader α with the payoff of the D-agent with largest
payoff (labeled γ3), together with the evolution of the fraction of cooperators in the
network.
For small values of the adaptability parameter p, as shown in panel (a), the
typical time for the network to reach a steady state is very large, and the leader α
increase its connectivity via (5) very slowly. The fraction of cooperators increases
on average as the leader increases its number of links. On the other hand for p ≈ 1,
the typical time to reach a steady state is very short (see Fig. 1), and in general
the leader is always the wealthiest agent of the whole population.
An interesting intermediate regime occurs for p ≈ 0.05 and high incentive to
defect b, where a competition between the cooperative leader and the most wealthy
defector arises. In this regime the number of links of the leader does not grow so fast
and defectors may get a significant large payoff due to the high value of b. Panel (b)
and (c) illustrates this situation. It is seen that there are time intervals in which the
leader is not wealthier than the D-agent γ with largest payoff. Whenever this event
occurs, large global cascades involving a large fraction of the whole population
are observed, with a significant fraction of the whole population being affected.
The initial dropout of the fraction of cooperators affects immediately the payoff of
exploiting D-agents and fC reaches a minimum approximately when the leader α
becomes once again the wealthiest agent in the network. Once this stable situation
is re-established, the leader may again increase its number of links until all D-agents
have links exclusively with other C-agents (pDD = 0).
An extreme example is observed in panel (c) at t ≈ 150, where the network is
composed of mostly D-agents together with a very wealthy leader. The leader is able
3 We remark that at every time step a different D-agent may become the agent γ
with largest pay-off. This is a consequence of the competitive nature of D-agents
in contrast to the conservative nature of C-agents.
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Fig. 3. Time series of fC and a re-scaled payoff of the cooperator leader (Πα) and
the D-agent with maximum payoff (Πγ). (a) p = 0.005, b = 1.35, (b) p = 0.01,
b = 1.75, (c) p = 0.05, b = 1.75 (K = 8).
to increases its number of links by the intense (unsuccessful) “searching” done by
D-agents, and by t ≈ 200 the fraction of cooperators also increases. This recovery
shows the importance of a wealthy leader, which enables a full cooperative final
outcome. Another situation worth mentioning is that whenever strong competition
between the leader and the wealthiest D-agent occurs, there is a possibility that
the system ends in a full defective network. This is what is shown happens in panel
(b) of Fig. 3. We remark that provided the initial fraction of C-agents is large, the
full defective network is rarely reached for high enough p.
The above results show that the dynamic evolution of the network is intimately
related to the fate of the leader. Another possible test, is to study how noise affects
the network dynamics. If the noise is in the form of selecting a random agent and
spontaneously changing its strategy, then the dominance of C-leaders is found to re-
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main for nearly the whole range of 1 < b < 2, for a sufficiently small noise intensity.
However when the probability of a spontaneous change of strategy is increased,
we find that a transition to the full defective network becomes more probable4.
Clearly the leader may suffer such perturbations, and induce large cascades in the
system. If such drastic perturbations have a small probability, the system has time
to reach the cooperative outcome before the new leader is knocked down again.
The simulation described in Fig. 4 illustrates how the system reaches a steady state
at t ≈ 180, and a spontaneous change of strategy was applied to the leader: large
cascades results and a final cooperative outcome is again recovered. The transient
oscillations observed in Fig. 4 at t ≈ 50 before a steady state is reached, as well as
the ones originated by the change of strategy of the leader constitute a Sysiphus
effect. The drop in the fraction of cooperators comes together with a large increase
of pDD. Thanks to its adaptability, the network reacts creating more C-C links.
However the attempts to build up a large cooperative behavior are not always suc-
cessful and the system goes through oscillations in which non-cooperative behavior
with large values of pDD is recovered. The frustrated attempts to build cooperation
indicate that for cooperation to be robust, it has be built upon a specific networks
of links. In the frustrated attempts to reach a collective stable cooperative state,
the fraction of cooperators becomes large, but the spatial arrangement of links in
the network is not the proper one.
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Fig. 4. Time series of fC , where at t = 200 the leader agent changes strategy from
C to D. Parameter values: b = 1.75, K = 8, p = 0.05.
4 In fact a full defective network is reached for b > b∗∗, where the critical b∗∗
depends on the noise intensity.
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5 Discussion
We have introduced a model of cooperation on an adaptive network, where coop-
eration is highly enhanced with respect to the situation of a fixed network. The
network adaptation involves exclusively the D-agents, which in some sense are al-
lowed to “search” for new neighbors, in the hope of finding C-agents to be exploited.
Our study shows that this mechanism leads to a global cooperative state of the net-
work. The asymptotic state reached by the system is a steady state in which the
network structure and the average payoff per agent Π remains stationary. However,
most agents are unsatisfied, and continuously imitate the strategy of their neigh-
bors with highest payoff (most of them C-agents). The structure of the network
can be understood in terms of chains of cooperators with D-agents exploiting some
cooperators.
The network adaptation that we have implemented in our spatial game gives rise
to the emergence of a leader, a cooperator with maximum number of connections.
Whenever the leader is the wealthiest agent in the network, and defectors are still
“searching”, the leader may increase its number of links with other cooperators.
However, if some defector becomes wealthier than the leader, an unstable situation
occurs and large global cascades may take place. Such cascades can also be induced
if “noise” in the form of spontaneous change of the strategy is allowed.
We finally note that the dynamics described above cannot be explained in terms
of average agents. In the final mostly cooperative state the average wealth of de-
fectors is larger than the average cooperators wealth. The final collective state is
dominated by rare individuals which build-up cooperation in the whole population
because they have a number of links which is far from the average.
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